Putting plural self-awareness into practice: the phenomenology of expert musicianship by Salice, Alessandro et al.
UCC Library and UCC researchers have made this item openly available. Please let us know how
this has helped you. Thanks!
Title Putting plural self-awareness into practice: the phenomenology of expert
musicianship
Author(s) Salice, Alessandro; Høffding, Simon; Gallagher, Shaun
Publication date 2017-01-23
Original citation Salice, A., Høffding, S. and Gallagher, S. (2017) 'Putting plural self-
awareness into practice: the phenomenology of expert musicianship',
Topoi. doi:10.1007/s11245-017-9451-2
Type of publication Article (peer-reviewed)
Link to publisher's
version
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9451-2
Access to the full text of the published version may require a
subscription.
Rights © 2017, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. All rights
reserved. This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an
article published in Topoi. The final authenticated version is
available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11245-017-9451-2
Item downloaded
from
http://hdl.handle.net/10468/6702
Downloaded on 2019-04-19T20:36:23Z
1 
 
Penultimate Version of a Paper Published in Topoi. An International Review of Philosophy. First 
Online: 23 January 2017. DOI: 10.1007/s11245-017-9451-2 
 
Please quote from published version. 
 
 
Putting Plural Self-Awareness Into Practice:  
The Phenomenology of Expert Musicianship. 
 
Alessandro Salice 
Department of Philosophy, University College Cork 
alessandro.salice@ucc.ie 
 
Simon Høffding 
Department of Psychology, University of Copenhagen 
simon.hoeffding@gmail.com 
 
Shaun Gallagher 
Department of Philosophy, University of Memphis  
Philosophy Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts, University of Wollongong  
s.gallagher@memphis.edu 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Based on a qualitative study about expert musicianship, this paper distinguishes three ways of 
interacting by putting them in relation to the sense of agency. Following Pacherie (2014), it highlights 
that the phenomenology of shared agency undergoes a drastic transformation when musicians 
establish a sense of we-agency. In particular, the musicians conceive of the performance as one single 
action towards which they experience an epistemic privileged access. 
 
The implications of these results for a theory of collective intentionality are discussed by addressing 
two general questions: When several individuals share an intention, does this fact secure plural self-
knowledge? And is it possible to have non-observational knowledge about a collective action? It is 
claimed that the results drawn from the study about expert musicianship supports negative answers 
to both questions. 
 
Keywords: Joint Action; Practical Knowledge; Shared Intention; Pre-reflective Self-Awareness; 
Expert Musicianship 
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1. Self-Knowledge and Practical Knowledge. 
 
There is widespread agreement within debate on collective intentionality about the idea that agency 
not only comes in individual, but also in collective forms. It is generally assumed that the notion of 
collective intention is the horse pulling the cart in the explanation of collective agency: for an action 
to be a collective action, it has to be performed upon a collective intention. This paper operates under 
the same assumption and aims at answering two different and yet interconnected questions: Are 
collective intentions grounded in plural self-knowledge? And is it possible to have non-observational 
knowledge about a collective action? The article argues in favor of negative answers to both questions.  
 
However, before rushing to the arguments in support of the suggested answers, one is perhaps well 
advised to first have a look at individual agency. In the literature, some have claimed that, if an agent 
intends to φ, she has “pre-reflective self-awareness” (henceforth: PSA).1 Hans Bernhard Schmid 
(2014, 2016, MS) describes the PSA that accompanies intentions as a form of personal knowledge 
characterized by four general features: self-identification, self-commitment, self-authorization and 
self-validation. Let us have a brief look at these features. 
 
To know that “I intend to φ” is self-identifying, for Schmid, because it “infallibly” establishes the 
identity of the intender: if you know you intend to φ, you know it is you who intends to φ.2 To put 
this differently, PSA is a feature of intentions by which the intention immediately presents itself to 
the subject as his or her intention, i.e., as an intention had by him or her. Also, knowledge of the form 
“I intend” leaves no motivational gap and hence it self-commits. In Schmid’s words: it blocks 
challenges of the form “I intend – but why should I care?” In addition, this form of knowledge 
warrants self-authorization: knowledge of the form “I intend” puts the intender in the privileged 
position of the one who knows best about what he intends – given that the intender is the one who 
has made up his own mind. Such privilege is rooted in the epistemology of this form of knowledge, 
this being self-validating: knowledge of the form “I intend” is immune against challenge concerning 
its source. If you intend to φ, you know it immediately and non-inferentially because, Schmid 
maintains, it is in virtue of the very form of knowledge itself that you know. 
 
This form of self-knowledge displayed by the subject having an attitude (an intention) impacts the 
knowledge the subject has about the action she may perform upon that attitude. In fact, one way to 
reformulate the above is that the agent does not need to observe random intentions to know which 
intentions are her intentions: having an intention always is having an intention of which the agent 
knows immediately that it is her intention – and this is because having an intention is accompanied 
                                                          
1 The concept and label of “pre-reflective self-awareness” are of phenomenological provenance (cf. Zahavi 
1999, 2005), but in this paper we are forced to leave significance and implications of the phenomenological 
concept for the topic at issue out of consideration.  
2 Some authors contend that an agent can have unconscious intentions as well as perhaps false beliefs about 
having (and maybe even acting upon) certain intentions (cf. Pacherie 2001 and Bratman 2009), but we can 
bracket these complications for the purposes of this article. 
3 
 
by PSA. Hence, if the action of φ-ing is the agent’s intentional action in the sense that it is an action 
she is performing upon her intention to φ, then she does not need to observe her bodily movements 
or her activities to know (to have practical knowledge about) which of them are her intentional actions. 
To put this differently, her intentional actions are individuated by her intentions: the agent, by having 
an intention, knows why she is performing a particular action (Anscombe 1969: 80) and thus she is 
in the unique position to form beliefs about her action that are not gained by observation. Here is a 
famous example made by Anscombe that illustrates this point: 
 
“Say I go over to the window and open it. Someone who hears me moving calls out: What are 
you doing making that noise? I reply ‘Opening the window.’ […] But I don’t say the words 
like this: ‘Let me see, what is this body bringing about? Ah yes! the opening of the window’. 
Or even like this ‘Let me see, what are my movements bringing about? The opening of the 
window’. To see this, if it is not already plain, contrast this case with the following one: I open 
the window and it focuses a spot of light on the wall. Someone who cannot see me but can see 
the wall, says ‘What are you doing making that light come on the wall?’ and I say ‘Ah yes, 
it’s opening the window that does it’, or ‘That always happens when one opens that window 
at midday if the sun is shining.’ (Anscombe 1969: 51)  
 
Arguably, without the intention of opening the window, the agent simply would not know what it is 
that she is doing. But if the agent performs an action upon that intention, this puts the agent’s 
perspective within the action itself, as it were: the action is experienced from within and not observed 
from the outside.3 Said another way, the agent’s knowledge about some aspects of her action is 
distinctive in the sense that it is not obtained by observation. This is not to deny the relevance of 
observation to action for “[o]bservation enables the agent to notice and correct mistakes; but what 
counts as a mistake here is determined by what the agent is doing, and this in turn is to a considerable 
extent determined by what he intends to be doing” (Falvey 2000: 29). 
 
To be sure, it is an open question in the literature how to understand Anscombe’s idea of non-
observational practical knowledge (cf. Velleman 1989, Moran 2004, Rödl 2007, Schwenkler 2015). 
Luckily, we believe that this debate can be sidestepped for the purposes of this article. The paper does 
not attempt to positively characterize what non-observational practical knowledge is, but it confines 
its understanding to the idea that perceptions and cognate cognitive processes do not justify - or 
provide a reason for - the agent’s belief of what she is doing (cf. Falvey 2000). What is more important 
for the paper is the relation between the self-knowledge that accompanies the agent’s intention to act 
and the non-observational practical knowledge (on the minimal understanding just illustrated):4 
                                                          
3 When we henceforth speak of “knowledge from within” or “knowing from within,” we refer to the non-
observational knowledge the agent has about what she is doing.  
4 Another relevant issue - the treatment of which would exceed the scope of this paper - hinges on the relation 
between these two states of knowledge: some believe that the relation is inferential, cf. Paul 2009; while other 
deny this, cf. Setiya 2011. 
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without the PSA displayed in the intention, the agent would not have the first-personal perspective 
towards her action that is intrinsic to the idea of non-observational knowledge about the action.  
 
The question is: does any of the above apply at the collective level? At first glance, there are important 
analogies to be acknowledged between the individual and the collective case. As said above, we take 
for granted that there are instances of shared agency and that, if the agency qualifies as intentional, 
then it is so because the agents “share” a corresponding intention. We will not enter into the question 
of how, exactly, the “sharedness” or “collectivity” of the intention has to be explained in this case: 
there already are a number of accounts of collective intentions (for a survey, cf. Schweikard/Schmid 
2013).  
 
Rather, the purpose of this article is to test whether there is a sense of sharing an intention for which 
plural pre-reflective self-awareness (or “PPSA” for short) is foundational in the same way in which 
(individual) PSA is foundational for having an (individual) intention.5  
 
Some believe: yes – if an intention is shared by several individuals, the shared intention displays 
PPSA: “intentional joint action is action which is collectively intended in terms of an intention of 
which there is plural self-knowledge” (Schmid MS: 5, our emphasis, cf. also Schmitz 2016).6 And, 
given that self-knowledge about the intention enables non-observational or “groundless” knowledge 
about the action: “the idea that the participants have groundless knowledge of what it is they are doing 
together makes good sense” (Schmid 2016: 73, our emphasis)7.  
 
We disagree.8 Our disagreement is substantiated by an investigation into a real life case of collective 
agency: in section 2, we begin by introducing the world-renowned Danish String Quartet and analyze 
the nature and structure of their musical collaboration. In section 3, we describe three different ways 
in which the musicians can interact, and we highlight their cognitive and affective pre-conditions. It 
is claimed that one of these forms of interactions is enabled by the establishment of a sense of we-
                                                          
5 One can certainly find accounts of collective intentions in the literature that either do not conceptually require 
anything like PPSA (because they attempt to explain collective intentions without recurring to any notion of a 
plural subject, cf. Bratman 2014) or that simply do not operate with PPSA (because they employ other notions 
as explanans of collective intentionality, e.g., the we-mode – cf. Tuomela 2007). In addition, it may also be 
that PPSA itself comes in many forms: recently, Schmitz argued that there are forms of collective self-
awareness in joint attention, perception and action, which are “below the level of rationality and reasoning and 
do not involve reasons and obligations.” (Schmitz 2016). The target of this article, however, is only the idea 
that PPSA is foundational for collective intentions. We are thankful to two anonymous reviewers for pushing 
us on this point. 
6 Schmid remarks that the four features of self-identification, self-commitment, self-authorization and self-
validation works in PPSA differently than in PSA (cf. Schmid 2016). Still, he maintains that these two forms 
of awareness are species of the same genus or kind. 
7 For another approach to joint action inspired by Anscombe, but which does not appeal to the idea of PPSA, 
cf. Laurence 2011). 
8 And we are not alone, cf. Blomberg 2017 (forthcoming). 
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agency among the musicians. The sense of we-agency strongly depends on cognitive and affective 
processes and it triggers an important transformation in the phenomenology of shared agency. On its 
basis, the musicians begin to conceive of the joint performance as one single we-action towards which 
they experience an epistemic privileged access. This phenomenology is unique and depends on the 
sense of we-agency, but it must be supported and maintained by observationally based cognitive 
processes, that is, by processes (like auditory or visual perception) that connect the agent’s cognitive 
system with her environment. More precisely, ‘supported and maintained’ here specifically means 
that these cognitive processes justify the agent’s belief about what she is doing.9 Accordingly, our 
interim conclusion will be that, whatever it means to share intentions, shared intentions do not ground 
non-observational knowledge about our actions. The only way for a participating individual to know 
what we are doing is by observing (in a broad sense, not necessarily restricted to vision) what his or 
her interactants are doing. 
 
This has consequences for the notion of PPSA. Section 4 generalizes the conclusion achieved in the 
previous parts of the paper by mounting an argument in the modus tollens: If PPSA accompanies 
shared intentions, then PPSA should be able to generate practical knowledge of a non-observational 
kind about the collective action performed upon those shared intentions. But there is no non-
observational knowledge of the collective action: even the unique form of awareness of the we-action 
described in this article, which is established on the basis of a peaking we-agency, is and remains 
observationally based. Therefore, we will conclude, there is no PPSA accompanying shared 
intentions. 
 
2. The Danish String Quartet: Background  
 
Let us start with a few brief methodological remarks. In this paper we will rely on reports by expert 
musicians acquired via qualitative interviews.  Using qualitative interviews to ground philosophical 
arguments is not a simple or unproblematic affair. It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to 
engage in lengthy methodological considerations (but see Ravn & Hansen 2013, Høffding & Martiny 
2016, Petitmengin 2006). We presuppose what we think is demonstrated in these just mentioned 
articles, namely that thorough qualitative interviews can indeed be used for the purpose of advancing 
philosophical arguments. In the following, we rely on such interviews with the musicians of “The 
Danish String Quartet” [DSQ] and on work by Elizabeth Pacherie (2014) to analyze the nature of 
their musical collaboration.  
 
i. The Danish String Quartet 
 
                                                          
9 Those, who emphasize the role of self-knowledge for practical knowledge, can well agree on the supporting, 
maintaining and perhaps even enabling role of perception and of other cognitive processes for intentional 
agency, but they would still deny that these processes justify or provide a reason for the agent’s belief of what 
she is doing (cf. Falvey 2000). 
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Over the last ten years the DSQ (Frederik Øland, violin; Rune Tonsgaard, violin; Asbjørn Nørgaard, 
viola; Fredrik Sjölin, cello10) has become an acknowledged chamber ensemble on the world stage of 
classical music.11 The members started their individual training at ages 4-7 and had, at the time of the 
interviews, played between 22 and 24 years - about 10 of these together in the DSQ.12 Besides various 
musical side projects in other orchestras or musical ensembles and concerts in Copenhagen, their 
home base, they as of recently tour more than one hundred days a year. This history of performance 
brings their total time playing together to several – if not ten – thousand hours, and thus provides an 
excellent case study of the experience of group intentionality.  
 
ii. Playing in a string quartet. 
 
Playing in a professional string quartet is a difficult and highly specialized kind of group action, 
primarily due to its technical and artistic sophistication. This can be described as a goal directed 
activity because all agents intend to achieve a common goal – namely to play a piece of music in a 
way that satisfies certain aesthetic criteria. The goal itself is of a peculiar kind. The piece as performed 
is a whole, a unity that can only be brought about by the interlocked contributions of four musicians. 
It cannot be understood as a divisible entity, in which each performer contributes 25% of the content. 
Three musicians performing a string quartet does not add up to 75% of a string quartet, it makes for 
0%. Put differently, it is a unity that does not reduce to its parts. To make a contrast case, the 
construction of a large building surely requires a multiplicity of agents, but reducing the number of 
workers from 90 to 80 does not make that endeavor impossible, but only slower. A performed string 
quartet is intrinsically unified, constituted by four equal members. 
 
In addition, to be successfully brought about, the activity requires high expertise and this translates 
into extensive rehearsal. As mentioned, the DSQ has spent thousands of hours playing together. An 
outcome thereof is that the musicians know each other in the kind of way intimate friends know each 
other: they operate in a regime of deep trust and mutual reliability. As we shall see, this notion of 
trust is quintessential to appreciate the nature of their shared activity. 
 
Adding to these more general features, it is helpful to employ some of Pacherie’s distinctions to 
determine more precisely the nature of the joint action in which the DSQ engages. Pacherie (2014: 
34) distinguishes joint actions on the basis of four criteria: their structure, scale, degree of 
specialization, and longevity or transience of the collective. How does the activity of playing in a 
quartet stand vis à vis these four criteria?  
 
To begin with, a joint activity can be seen as more or less hierarchical (think of the hierarchy of 
military command) or egalitarian (think of a beach volley ball team playing a game). In a string 
quartet, although the first violinist usually plays the melody and in some sense “leads” the unfolding 
                                                          
10 To avoid confusion between the violinist and the cellist, we shall henceforth name the former, Frederik Ø. 
11 See: http://danishquartet.com/ 
12 Only the current cellist joined later in 2008. 
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of the musical piece, the setting is structurally egalitarian insofar as each performer fully depends on 
the other in order for the piece to unfold. A quartet is a symmetrical relation of co-workers.  
 
Moreover, the scale of a joint activity also determines the nature of the experience of the engagement. 
Whereas a beach-volley ball team consisting of only two players are aware of what each other is 
doing at all times during a game (victory being premised on such coordination), the foot-soldier on 
the beach at the Normandy invasion in 1944, to use Pacherie’s own example, has very little 
understanding of the broader scale of whether the mission was going according to plan (Ibid). Since 
a string quartet always consists of four musicians, it engages in joint action of a small-scale. 
 
If the roles of the participants of a joint action are highly specialized and not interchangeable, this 
again limits the possibility of equally distributed knowledge. Pacherie adds that if the participants 
have interchangeable roles: “they may have a motor repertoire allowing them to engage in perception-
action matching and motor simulation as well as the knowledge needed to form task representations; 
they would thus be in a position to precisely represent the goals and actions of their co-agents and 
make accurate other- and joint predictions.” (Ibid). In a classical string quartet, there are three kinds 
of instruments: Two violins, a viola and a cello. The motor repertoire necessary to master these 
instruments is certainly similar, proved by the fact that the DSQ occasionally perform pieces (of folk 
music) where they all play the violin. Nevertheless, asking them to exchange instruments for the 
performance of just about any demanding quartet piece, would be impossible or lead to a very poor 
result. Given this contrast, it is fair to assume that, from the perspective of the quality of performance, 
each player’s skill is highly specialized and not interchangeable, but from the perspective of the 
possibility of action-perception matching and motor simulation, it is the case that each member has a 
near-identical motor-repertoire sufficient for accurate joint predictions. 
 
Finally, the longevity of a group also impacts the nature of its joint actions. Given the amount of time 
the musicians invest in the activity and to the relation of trust that obtains among them, one must 
conclude that the DSQ is characterized by longevity and by a robust and cemented group membership.  
 
3. The Phenomenology of Expert Musicianship: Three ways of playing in the DSQ 
 
The purpose of this section is to highlight some of the many structurally different ways in which 
musicians can play together and to establish that one of these involves a sense of we-agency. To do 
so, the line of argument substantially draws on seminal work done by Pacherie on the phenomenology 
of joint action (Pacherie 2014). In the following, some of her distinctions are put to use in the DSQ 
case study in order to explicate three forms of musical interaction. Each of these are based on a 
different, primary cognitive, mechanism. We label each form of interaction by using the term 
designating their primary mechanism, which are “motor-resonance,” “explicit coordination” and 
“interkinesthetic affectivity”. Establishing three distinct forms of musical interaction has several 
implications for the understanding of joint musical interaction. Firstly, it shows that musical 
interaction isn’t just one thing, but that it can proceed through a range of different conscious and sub-
conscious processes. Secondly, it shows that some forms of successful coordination can proceed 
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without a sense of we-agency. Finally, it shows that there is a (rather rare) form of interaction that 
seems to entail a strong sense of we-agency. 
 
i. Motor-resonance  
 
Let us begin by dismissing a widespread assumption: prima facie, one might think that in order to 
play well together, members of a small musical group would have to pay attention to what the others 
are doing. This is also claimed by a number of music psychologists (Seddon and Biasutti 2009, Keller 
2008). But in the following example from Asbjørn, the DSQ gives us reason to question the necessity 
of such awareness. 
 
 
So recently, there was this concert, in which Frederik [Ø]… was very moved by a 
movement of Beethoven, where Rune hadn’t noticed at all that he [Frederik Ø] had been 
crying and Rune decisively hadn’t seen it. 
 
But you saw it? 
 
I saw it and Fredrik (the cellist) also saw it. And another time on the last England tour, 
where Rune had all kinds of problems with his shoulder and he had been sitting for an 
entire Beethoven Quartet in which Frederik [Ø] played 1st violin and Rune 2nd violin, 
and Rune had been sitting and placed his arm on the thigh whenever he could and Fredrik 
(the cellist) and I were immediately afterwards towards Rune “Are you ok?” and where 
Frederik [Ø] hadn’t discovered anything what so ever, even if he had been looking at 
him… 
 
The first situation portrays a musician sitting just next to another who completely fails to notice the 
other’s actions, all the while the performance proceeds smoothly. In the second case cited, Rune has 
such strong pain in his shoulder that he must rest it at the slightest pause in the music – and, again, 
his co-performer sitting just to his right is not aware of that. According to Asbjørn, the first violinist 
tends to “fly out” and more often enters a deep state of absorption in which he is inattentive or even 
oblivious of the world and, crucially, even of his co-players, around him. We are not going to address 
this experiential state in any detail (but see Høffding 2015). Rather we are after how Frederik Ø 
manages to coordinate with Rune, without consciously perceiving Rune’s actions.  
 
One account could be that, although Frederik Ø might not be consciously seeing Rune, he is adjusting 
to him through conscious listening. We do not dispute that in many circumstances conscious listening 
is sufficient to establish successful coordination (given the right level of expertise). However, it seems 
that not even conscious listening is necessary for successful coordination. In fact, if Frederik Ø had 
been consciously listening to Rune, he would have noticed the slight audible changes that follow from 
the kind of pains Rune was feeling and subsequently realize what kind of situation Rune was in. Most 
likely, members of the audience would not notice that, but the quartet members are intimately attuned 
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to one another and perceive the minutest of details and changes. We know of expert musicians’ 
heightened aesthetic sensitivity and general enhanced auditory perception from empirical studies 
(Kraus & Chandrasekaran 2010, Kraus, Strait & Parbery-Clark 2012). But there is also circumstantial 
evidence for this claim: the interviewer, when touring with the DSQ, during a rehearsal was asked 
for advice about which musical emphasis or interpretation was better and, although fairly well-trained 
in classical music, was completely unable to distinguish one from the other. 
 
In the instance above, we believe that an appeal to sub-conscious mechanisms can lift the explanatory 
burden of coordination without conscious perception. Pacherie mentions several functions in this 
regard of which we wish to point to two: entrainment and motor simulation. 
 
Firstly, the DSQ enters into a process of entrainment, which can be characterized as follows: “a 
process whereby two people involuntarily synchronize their behaviour, even in the absence of direct 
mechanical coupling. Thus, two people sitting next to each other in rocking chairs will unconsciously 
synchronize their rocking frequency and do so even when they have chairs with different 
eigenfrequencies” (Pacherie 2014, 31; on entrainment in musicians, cf. Clayton, Sager& Udo 2005, 
Clayton 2012, Doffman 2011). As a sub-personal process, entrainment can begin to account for the 
synchronization between Rune and Frederik Ø from the example above. But given the difficulty of 
coordinating musical expression in a string quartet, it seems implausible that entrainment alone can 
account for such rafinnement.  
 
Secondly, the other function that most likely plays a role in this form of interaction, is “motor 
simulation,” by which it is meant that: “the perception of an[other’s] action leads to the activation of 
a corresponding action representation in the observer’s action system.” (Pacherie 2014, 31) 
Perception of the other is required for this motor resonance system to kick in, but although the 
quotation above is supposed to demonstrate the lack of perceptual contact from Frederik Ø to Rune, 
the example certainly does not rule out instances of unconscious perception (Dehaene 2014). With 
his eyes saccading (Gilchrist 2011) between his score, the audience and the other players, Frederik Ø 
is probably picking up quite a bit of visual information from Rune, although without being 
phenomenally aware of it.13 
 
If these considerations are on the right track, one could establish that coordination can take place even 
in the absence of conscious perceptual contact and, further, that this can be explained with reference 
to sub-conscious processes. In this case, it is sensible to argue that the individuals are so immersed in 
                                                          
13 We have stated that motor-resonance is unconscious, but this claim can (and possibly should) be relaxed: 
although entrainment can occur without consciousness, such as when rocking chairs synchronize, and although 
implicit motor simulation is characterized as the activation of a sub-conscious brain-system, a minimal form 
of consciousness might accompany entrainment and motor-resonance. The point here, however, is that even if 
there is some subtle and vague form of pre-reflective consciousness at play in entrainment and motor-resonance, 
in the aforementioned DSQ case, it certainly does not penetrate into an awareness that consciously guides the 
joint performance. We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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the performance that they adapt their actions to the other agents’ contributions automatically and 
without paying attention to those contributions. In the example of Rune’s hurting arm, Frederik Ø is 
“out” thinking about or imagining something apart from the actual performance, Rune is focused on 
his pain, while the violist and cellist are aware of this lack of communication and understanding 
between Frederik Ø and Rune. This example signals that, although the DSQ-musicians certainly knew 
that they were contributing to one action (i.e., the group’s performance), none of the members was 
adopting the group’s perspective towards the performance, which – as it will be highlighted below – 
is quintessential for the sense of we-agency. 
 
Put differently, musical interaction can unfold without a sense of we-agency. All musicians access 
the collective performance from an I-perspective – the attempt being to coordinate several I-actions 
in order to perform a we-action. However, none of the musicians have a feeling of performing the 
we-action in the same sense in which each of them has the feeling to perform the I-action. Importantly, 
however, such lack of a sense of we-agency does not necessarily undermine the achievement of the 
goal: the performance can be successfully accomplished as intended. We will return to what the 
experience of we-agency more precisely consists in later on. 
 
ii. Explicit coordination  
 
The kind of unconscious coordination portrayed above is not the most usual kind of interaction 
between the DSQ members. When observing chamber ensemble musicians playing, one very often 
sees intentional communication in form of body language or facial expressions – cues in the form of 
winks, blinks and laughs. Sometimes, like in the case of Rune addressed above, there might be an 
element disturbing the unfolding of the performance and this may call for compensatory strategies. 
In the following, one can find Asbjørn speaking of two opposed forms of playing together: 
 
You get afraid of, you don’t really dare trusting it… I know I have to be together/in sync 
with Rune in something in three seconds, then I know that if I look at him and try to be 
together with him, then I know that it will be together and then it is perhaps not that 
idealistic and in the zone, but at least we are together and there you might be afraid in 
trusting that you are together, you become afraid of trusting the “hive-mind” and the 
“zone-forces” and at that point it might be, if it is a scary concert, that you choose this 
solution, which is not entirely ideal. 
 
For now, we focus on the situation that is marked by a lack of trust and reserve the “hive-mind” and 
“zone-forces” metaphors for the next section. The situation Asbjørn portrays differs from the previous 
one – in the scenario described before, Frederik Ø seems to be totally immersed in his individual I-
playing and relies on sub-conscious processes to coordinate with the other DSQ members. Here, by 
contrast, Asbjørn finds himself playing with Rune, but feels uncomfortable and uncertain whether 
they are adequately coordinated. In such a “scary concert,” he chooses “a solution, which is not 
entirely ideal.” He focuses his gaze at Rune to “try to be together with him,” that is, he tries to match 
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his own movements with his prediction of Rune’s. Asbjørn’s “trying to be together” with Rune 
indicates a lack of we-agency, for which the focusing of his gaze is supposed to compensate. 
 
Asbjørn’s actions are based on attentive visual perception and prediction of Rune’s play. The form 
of coordination that emerges could hence be characterized as “explicit” – it is explicit because it 
emerges from conscious, explicit and deliberate attitudes that Asbjørn take up to compensate for the 
risk of not being together in the first place. The sense of agency here is almost antagonistic: Whereas 
in the previous scenario the “you” and an “I” are almost completely implicit (at least from Frederik 
Ø’s perspective), here they are fully explicit and at constant risk of miscommunication and 
miscoordination.  
 
As with the form of interaction running solely off subconscious resonance mechanisms, explicit 
coordination is also not the most ordinary form of musical interaction. The DSQ members normally 
enjoy playing together. They trust in each other, and in peak instances of such trust, their interaction 
seems to rely on a different mechanism. 
 
iii. Interkinesthetic affectivity14 
 
Back to Asbjørn’s curious metaphors of the “hive-mind” and the “zone-forces”. Asbjørn is an 
enthusiastic gamer and the “hive-mind” refers to hive dwelling aliens that although composed of a 
large number of individual bodies act as if parts of one large organism. In the DSQ setting, these 
metaphors refer to a scenario in which Asbjørn trusts the agentive situation and in which he then does 
not have “to try to be together with [Rune]”. Let us probe the meaning of this regime of trust, as a 
mark of an altogether different kind of coordination – Asbjørn goes further: 
 
It is just such a special feeling, if we perform a concert and there is a movement where it 
just clicks, because I’ve playing a lot of computer and sometimes demanded what I call 
“hive-mind”… where you have this feeling that I know, without knowing, I know what 
Frederik will do in 3 seconds and then I can do something that matches damn well, and 
then, I have also talked about as if it is a bubble…  
 
When you perform in the quartet, you know precisely when to play the tones, you know 
what the others are doing without looking at them. When everyone in the quartet is in this 
state, it is just like there is a bubble of sound over every ones’ heads that you can just 
form as you wish. 
 
Asbjørn somehow “knows” what his co-players will do before they do it and this knowledge is 
characterized as a feeling. The certainty or sense of control he has over his own technique comes to 
apply equally to the other musicians, to the extent that his sense of what he will do next is given on a 
par with what the others will do. Although he says that he knows “what Frederik will do in 3 seconds,” 
                                                          
14 This term is taken from Behnke 2008. 
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this is not the kind of prediction as the one of “explicit coordination”. Rather it points to a kind of 
affection, a feeling of intimate trust in the situation. Here is how Rune describes it: 
 
But I also enormously enjoy closing my eyes, even if we play very slowly and then trust 
that the other…that we follow one another, feel the energy, here we shift the bowing, that 
it does not become a thing of vision, but that you can sense it, there is the bow-shift, right? 
 
Let us describe in detail the kind of situation Rune and Asbjørn point to: What Rune reports might be 
interpreted as an agentive coupled system relying on a) auditory perception, b) affectivity, c) 
interoception and d) intersubjective proprioception or interkinestesia. 
 
a) Auditory perception. In the first place, Asbjørn and Rune share a focus on non-visual perception: 
“You know what the others are doing without looking at them” and “I enjoy closing my eyes”. A 
clear distinction between explicit coordination and this form of interaction is the reliance on different 
modes of perception. In explicit coordination, detailed visual, perceptual knowledge is called for to 
compensate for the lack of trust and mutual understanding. In this case, by contrast, coordination is 
already in place (most likely, in virtue of motor resonance) and the DSQ members can instead focus 
on listening, which apparently is connected to, or even enhances, a sense of trust and being together. 
They state that their need for visual communication decreases year by year and that musical intentions 
simply are more keenly perceived through hearing. 
 
b) Affectivity. In a recent paper on the phenomenology of joint action that nicely complements 
Pacherie’s work, Salmela and Nagatsu (2016) suggest that an essential element for the emergence of 
a sense of we-agency is affectivity: acting together “feels good” (Salmela and Nagatsu 2016: 18), but 
the contribution of affectivity to joint action is not restricted to that. In particular, they highlight the 
importance of shared emotions for the sense of we-agency and identify a specific case of interaction 
where the role of emotions felt together by the agents become particularly salient. These are ritualistic 
interactions that have “internal goals and standards of excellence […], such as staying in the same 
rhythm when we are dancing or singing together, doing some difficult part of our joint performance, 
and completing the performance rather than interrupting it. Shared emotions may emerge as rational 
responses to jointly achieving or failing to meet those internal norms of rituals” (Salmela and Nagatsu 
2016: 15). It is sensible to subsume musical interaction under the kind of activity that has internal 
goals. 
 
It is generally agreed that “sharedness” of emotions come in degrees and that it is accompanied by a 
sense of us-ness (Salmela 2012). This is crucial for the description because it allows the identification 
of those cases where the achievement of the activity’s internal goals together with the contributions 
by all other factors listed in this section can lead to emotions with a peaking sharedness character – 
that is, with an accentuated sense of us, that is, a sense that we are playing together. Note that this is 
compatible with the enhanced sense of trust that the DSQ members report to have when playing in 
this way. Immersing oneself in one’s hearing and in reciprocal trust has become cues for good and 
pleasant musical interaction for the DSQ. The nature of the trust at stake here is not a kind of explicit 
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knowledge that “if I do x, then you do y”, but a feeling that we are together and can give each other 
room to pursue a novel musical idea without the slightest doubt that everyone else will follow. 
 
c) Interoception. Playing together is interoceptively mediated. This might sound surprising, but one 
should not underestimate the following consideration: sound has the capacity to penetrate into objects, 
and more importantly, into bodies, through vibrating sound waves. When a musician says that she 
can feel the fellow musician’s playing, in addition to the straightforward emotional meaning, it also 
literally means that she feels the vibrations of the other’s playing in her body. This consideration 
might help appreciation of the intercorporeal dimension of playing together. It is not a metaphor to 
say that the musicians’ bodies touch each other through the sound they produce. Where the visual 
modality establishes distance, separation and a clear sense of boundaries between the DSQ members, 
interoception supports the sense of touching one another and being part of a corporeal unity.  
 
d) Intersubjective proprioception (interkinesthesia). Finally, perception and reciprocation of the 
other’s movements through hearing and interoception, especially when they are accompanied by a 
shared emotion, might lead to intersubjective proprioception or interkinesthesia.15 When Rune says: 
“here we shift the bowing,” he seems to be referring to a situation in which he experiences the other 
DSQ-members’ bow-shifts as intimately as he does his own.16 Apparently, as his knowledge of the 
position and movement of his own arms is proprioceptive and non-observational, likewise is his sense 
of the position and limbs of the three others in that particular bow-shift. Such a proprioceptive access 
to the other’s movements can be labeled as “interkinesthesia” or the joining of body schemas, a point 
to which we return below. 
 
It is hard to grasp the sense of contact in intersubjective proprioception. Let us attempt to clarify this 
point through the example of the sense of coordination between two Olympic-level rowers, Juliane 
and Anne: 
 
[T]he coupled situation calls for the rowers to find a common ground. This means that 
Juliane’s movements are also interwoven in, and affected and regulated by, Anne’s 
movements. Juliane seems to use her impediment in reaching an optimal state as a 
measuring stick for grasping Anne’s level. Furthermore, Juliane describes that she uses 
the coupled situation to “carry forward some sensations” and “impact the rhythm 
physically”. This indicates that Juliane pursues the feel for the good rhythm not only 
through her own body but also through Anne’s body (Leder, 1990; Fuchs & De Jaegher, 
2009) and is able to use the felt intersubjective kinaesthetic qualities as a launch pad to 
influence the joint rhythm. (Lund, Ravn & Christensen 2012: 184)  
 
                                                          
15 See He & Ravn (forthcoming) for an example from dance on the sense of shared intentionality in a joint 
project. 
16 It might even be that what Rune describes is an experience of a form of synesthesia between hearing and 
tactile perception. 
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When rowing a double scull, the front rower can see the rear one, but not the inverse. Their 
communication is not primarily verbal, but the kinesthetic dimension of the interaction is 
communicatively salient: kinesthesis is felt in the oars as extended limbs through the medium of the 
water and the boat itself. For Juliane to get a feel for the good rhythm, it is inadequate for her to just 
set a certain pace. She must feel and incorporate Anne’s pace through the medium of the ores in the 
water to get in sync and must continually adjust her own desire for a certain rhythm to that of Anne. 
Her sense of agency is at the same time delimited and extended to that of Anne. Similarly, in the case 
of the DSQ-members, the instruments can be seen as the analogues of ores and the played music as 
the analogue of water. If this is correct, then the DSQ members could be considered as being directly 
coupled through this joint system that envelops them all. The coordination that is generated from this 
kind of coupling is not primarily one of explicit prediction – although that might be involved – but 
rather a form of kinesthesia. 
 
This third kind of musical interaction appears to validate the idea of a “joint body schema” (Soliman 
& Glenberg 2014). There is well-established evidence for changes in the experience of peripersonal 
space (and its underlying neural basis) during tool use, often described in terms of the incorporation 
of tools into the agent’s body schema (Berti & Frassinetti 2000; Farnè et al. 2005). For example, 
Maravita and Iriki (2004) showed bimodal neurons in the parietal cortex have both somatosensory 
and visual receptive fields focused on the hand. Thus, neuronal activation increases for the visual 
receptive field as one looks near one’s hand. After use of a tool that extends one’s reach (e.g., a rake), 
the visual receptive field of these neurons expands to include the effector end of the tool. In other 
words, peripersonal space extends to include the area around the distant end of the tool. The same 
kind of extension of peripersonal space can be found during joint action. In an experiment involving 
two people coordinating their joint action on the task of sawing through a candle using a string that 
they kept taut as they were moving it back and forth, Soliman and Glenberg (2014) demonstrated, 
using complex visual vs tactile interference measures previously used to demonstrate incorporation 
of tools and extension of peripersonal space during tool use, that peripersonal space expanded to 
include the space around the other participant. They describe this as the establishment of a joint body 
schema “to incorporate the kinematics of partners” (Soliman et al. 2015). In effect, a form of what 
Merleau-Ponty calls ‘intercorporeity’ emerges from joint action and various forms of intersubjective 
interaction. We are suggesting that in music performance of the sort that involves interkinesthetic 
affectivity, one’s body schema or peripersonal space extends to include, not just instruments, but also 
the other players (cf. also Blomberg 2011, Heed et al. 2010, Teneggi et al. 2013).17   
 
Having differentiated these three mechanisms (motor-resonance, explicit coordination, 
interkinesthetic affectivity), it might be important to now turn to their reciprocal relations. On the one 
hand, we have suggested that, when the interkinestethic affectivity is lacking and the DSQ-members 
feel a lack of trust, explicit coordination seems to be able to save the day. Interkinesthetic affectivity 
on its own is sufficient, though apparently not necessary, for successful joint performance. On the 
                                                          
17 But it should not go unmentioned that, within empirical literature, there is some disagreement on the impact 
of others on peripersonal space (cf. Holmes et al. 2004, Holmes et al. 2007).  
15 
 
other hand, interkinestethic affectivity and explicit coordination do not have to be mutually exclusive 
bases for interaction. If interkinesthetic affectivity is functioning, it does not prevent the musicians 
from explicitly communicating, observing or predicting the other player’s performance (cf. Montero 
2010 and Sutton et al. 2012). 
 
As for the relation between explicit coordination and motor-resonance, it’s plausible that the former 
relies on the latter. As soon as you have visual contact – involving conscious perception or not – you 
get the requisite motor-mechanisms going. Inversely, as we have tried to show in the first example, 
one can indeed play together by means of mere motor-resonance without having to explicitly 
coordinate. We believe that it is in cases of a lack of felt trust that explicit coordination becomes 
necessary for successful joint performance.  
 
How about the relation between motor-resonance and interkinesthetic affectivity? As a subconscious 
mechanism, motor-resonance probably underpins interkinesthetic affectivity to help ensure the 
overall coordination. We may also conceive of motor-resonance and interkinesthetic affective as 
located on a continuum. Even if conceptualized as non-conscious, entrainment, mirror-resonance and 
body schemas, joint or otherwise, surely become more and more refined and attuned with practice. 
However, only when coupled with the affective intentionality of deep trust, does the change in agency 
from singular to plural come about. Interkinesthetic affectivity is a phenomenological or experiential 
aspect of playing together, which arises when trust and shared affect are at the forefront of experience 
and which makes explicit coordination unnecessary. In the first example Frederik Ø is inattentive to 
Rune and we have stipulated that here motor-resonance explains how playing unfolds in a perfectly 
coordinated fashion nevertheless. In this case, however, although there is no marked sense (or 
phenomenological registration) of interkinesthetic affectivity, we believe it still operates in a weaker 
form in the experiential background. We think so because, in any case of playing together, auditory 
perception, and interoception are necessarily present, although in this particular case only tacitly. 
Again, motor-resonance and interkinesthetic affectivity may be described as two extreme poles in a 
continuous process. Only when appearing in the foreground of awareness (Colombetti 2014, Legrand 
2007), however, do the components of interkinesthetic affectivity give rise to its fullest expression, 
which is where the alteration from singular to we-agency most saliently takes place. Consider a 
further description from Fredrik. 
 
[…] there were a couple of times where I was surprised by where we were going…. 
Suddenly we find ourselves in a tempo we hadn’t planned for at all, but we couldn’t have 
done otherwise, because the preceding notes leading into it, they had laid the ground for 
it. And then you cannot get out of it. 
 
Fredrik reports feeling that the music is going somewhere not planned for and is surprised by how it 
moves, but at no point does he indicate that the DSQ members are not fully synchronized. This is 
described as a pleasant experience in which they are fully tuned to one another and coordinate to 
microscopic bodily movements. Again, an unplanned change of tempo happens and everyone follows 
along, and although the entire quartet might be surprised by where it was going, none of them could 
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say that it was “he” who had initiated the change. This clearly signals an altered sense of agency. 
More precisely, the fact that they all followed unencumbered indicates that this altered sense of 
agency is a shared one.18 Experiencing the performance in this way, it seems, is experiencing the 
performance as something that we, together, are doing. Instead of feeling the performance to flow out 
of my singular and individual effort, I feel it as the result of our collective and fused effort. In other 
words, I experience the we-action from within the we-action itself – that is, I do not experience the 
we-action as something that is brought about by my I-action coordinating with other actions. I rather 
experience bringing about the we-action.19   
 
The interim conclusion, hence, is that interkinesthetic affectivity is unique in generating a feeling of 
we-agency, a “hive-mind” in which one’s own perception-action loops are coupled to other bodies 
(in an intercorporeity that is also describable in terms of in joint body schemas or the experience of 
extended peripersonal space), and thus loop intersubjectively.  
 
4. Plural Pre-reflective Self-Awareness. 
 
In illustrating the possibility for the four musicians to develop a sense of we-agency, our interim 
conclusion also illustrates that it is only in certain cases that this happens. In all likelihood, such a 
sense of agency comes in degree (as all its ingredients like trust, the intensity of the collective emotion, 
etc. come in degree) and it peaks when interkinesthesia is at the forefront of the DSQ members’ 
experience. Once it is in place, the sense of individual agency is transformed – one feels totally 
absorbed by the group’s activity. This is a fragile and unstable condition – one, however, that is 
facilitated by the kind of interaction at stake and by the other conditions mentioned in the previous 
two sections.  
 
It is now time to turn to the form of practical knowledge encapsulated in interaction and to our initial 
question of whether this knowledge has the same features as in individual agency. Remember we 
have assumed from the start that the musicians share the intention to play the piece. The shared 
intention is the element that steers and governs the DSQ’s action. 20 What we are after here is whether 
                                                          
18 Importantly, as indicated by Fredrik, the change in the sense of agency is not merely from an “I” to a “we”. 
It is also a change from an “I do” to a “this happens to us”. You experience the music as an agential system 
whose “will” you must subject yourself to in order to deliver an authentic performance. It is of great interest, 
but beyond the scope of the paper, to flesh out the way in which some sense of agency is relinquished to the 
music, while another form of agency, experienced as “trust” or “freedom” is enhanced. Preliminarily this 
would support Salmela and Nagatsu’s point that individual agency and we-agency are not opposed but 
complimentary (2016). 
19 This is in line with the phenomenon of “boundary loss” in joint action described by Pacherie (Pacherie 2014, 
40). Note, however, that one of the conditions Pacherie mention for the emergence of this phenomenon, i.e., 
the similarity of the actions performed (her example is a military march) is not equally fulfilled in the DSQ’s 
case – here, the musicians’ actions are similar only on a coarse-grained scale. 
20 To reinforce our point, we believe that there is a clear difference between the notion of highly synchronized 
or coordinated actions and the idea of a joint or collective action (cf. Sánchez Guerrero 2016: 80f) and we take 
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there is a sense of sharing an intention that displays plural self-knowledge – analogous to the sense 
in which having an (individual) intention displays self-knowledge. If that were the case, then the 
group would have an immediate, non-observational access to the we-action identical to the one 
advocated for the singular case. This seems to be Schmid’s view: “knowledge in question [i.e., the 
knowledge at stake in joint actions] is plural pre-reflective and non-thematic self-awareness of what 
it is the participants are doing together” (Schmid 2016: 51, our brackets and emphasis). 
 
However, the result of our study about expert musicianship indicates that the epistemically privileged 
access to the we-action is not of the same kind as the one exemplified in the singular case. In addition, 
it shows that such an access is granted only in certain cases and that it is granted only to individual 
agents, not to groups. 
 
To see why, let us first look into cases where no sense of we-agency has been established, that is, into 
cases where the sense of individual agency has not undergone any transformation – for instance, when 
the interaction runs either on motor resonance alone or is coupled with explicit coordination. Here 
we have individuals who adjust their I-actions to the actions of the others agents – either 
unconsciously or consciously. As emphasized above, there is no reason to deny that, when this 
happens, the level of coordination can even peak, making the overall performance a success.  
 
However, for the adjustment to be achieved, substantial cognitive resources have to be allocated to 
observational means. They are observational in the broad sense according to which they track 
something in the world and they make information available to the agent. When the interaction is 
based on motor resonance alone, these means are merely sub-personal: the agent has information 
about the others’ action that is not processed consciously (cf. Huebner 2013). She adjusts her behavior 
to events and facts in the world, although she is not consciously attending to them. By contrast, in 
explicit coordination it is by observing and monitoring what the fellow musicians are doing that 
coordination is enabled and the performance unfolds. In other words, processes like conscious 
observation, prediction and inference are here required for the action of playing the quartet to be 
performed (the joint action would just not have taken place without those processes). In both cases 
(motor resonance and explicit coordination), each musician has first-personal knowledge about the 
singular contribution each of them provide, i.e., about the I-action each of them performs, whereas 
knowledge of the joint performance is third-personal – because knowledge of the other’s actions is 
third-personal and inferential. 
 
Now, this is what the musicians report when the sense of agency has undergone transformation:  
 
[…] where you have this feeling that I know, without knowing, I know what Frederik will do 
in 3 seconds and then I can do something that matches damn well, and then, I have also talked 
about as if it is a bubble […] When you perform in the quartet, you know precisely when to 
                                                          
the view for granted that the latter idea is to be explained by referring to shared intentions. Our argument only 
targets the view that there is a sense of sharing an intention which displays PPSA.  
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play the tones, you know what the others are doing without looking at them. When everyone in 
the quartet is in this state, it is just like there is a bubble of sound over every ones’ heads that 
you can just form as you wish. 
 
The musicians report knowing what the others are doing or will be doing more by an immediate feel 
(inside the bubble) than by observing and inferring (“without looking at them”) – at least, this is 
compatible with the conceptual framework developed so far. Accordingly, the players seem to have 
non-observational and non-inferential knowledge about the collective action – and, hence, they could 
be said to experience the collective performance from within the action itself. This claim, however, 
requires a more precise assessment and the remainder of this article is devoted to its evaluation. To 
begin with, the term “non-observational” needs qualification. 
 
On the one hand, the phenomenology of agency undergoes a transformation with the emergence of a 
sense of we-agency: the experience of performing the we-action presents itself to the agents in a non-
observational way. That is, once the sense of we-agency is in place, it enables the musicians to adopt 
a perspective that lies within the collective action itself. The I-action and the you-action are not any 
longer experienced as something to be done in order to bring about the collective action identified by 
the shared intention. To put this another way: they are no longer conceived of as singular contributions 
by means of which the we-action is performed (cf. Salice 2015). Rather they are now conceived of as 
one we-action, towards which the agents experience to have an epistemically privileged access. The 
we-action is experienced as ours with an immediacy that closely resembles the one at stake in 
individual action and, consequently, it can be said that the awareness about the we-action presents 
itself to the musicians as non-inferential. Without such sense of we-agency, the musicians can 
certainly be aware of the fact that they are performing one we-action, but this awareness is gained by 
means of conscious inferences: I know that a we-action is in the process of being performed because 
I know that my I-action aptly interlocks with your I-action. In addition, the practical knowledge 
emerging together with the sense of we-agency is not about a coarse action (the underdetermined fact 
that the musicians are playing a piece together), but it rather concerns fine-grained aspects and 
features of the action itself (the rhythm, the interpretation of the piece, its emotional message, etc.). 
It can be presumed that the more intense the sense of we-agency, the more specific the action 
identification. All this makes the practical awareness at stake in these circumstances fairly unique. 
 
On the other hand, it should be pointed out that a large part of the cognitive processes that need to be 
in place for the sense of we-agency to be triggered include a mixture of personal and sub-personal 
processes. Some of them, such as those of motor-resonance, simply are inaccessible to consciousness, 
but all of them secure information via salient cognitive relations with the world. Accordingly, 
information about the world (and specifically about the actions of other agents) grounds and remains 
a necessary condition for the transformation of phenomenology in we-agency. Without these 
processes there would be no sense of we-agency and without the sense of we-agency the musicians 
would not experience any privileged access to the we-action. Put another way: even if, 
phenomenologically, practical awareness in we-agency presents itself as non-observational, it is not 
– for it is justified by important observationally based cognitive relations between the individuals. 
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Such relations provide reasons for the agents to believe that they are performing one we-action, 
although these reasons are not consciously accessed.21  
 
Having assessed the form of practical knowledge encapsulated in musical interaction, it is now 
possible to turn to the notion of PPSA. First, recall that singular PSA was portrayed as a form of self-
knowledge displayed by the subject’s intention, which is able to secure non-observational knowledge 
about the subject’s action. Now, PPSA, according to the claim under scrutiny, is as a form of self-
knowledge, which is foundational for the group to intend to φ and which puts the group in the subject 
(not in the content) position of the awareness (that is, the ‘self’ the knowledge is about is a plural self 
and not an individual self). Our considerations reject this understanding of PPSA as untenable. It is 
untenable because, if such PPSA were in place, then the group (and the musicians as the group’s 
members) would acquire genuine non-observational knowledge about the performance just in virtue 
of the mere fact of having the intention to play together. However, it has been shown that, although 
the phenomenology that accompanies these cases of interaction can diverge substantially, the only 
way to secure knowledge about the we-action is by (consciously or unconsciously) observing it as 
arising out of the coordination between several individual actions. Even in the case of interkinesthesia, 
where practical knowledge presents itself to the agents as non-inferential and non-observational, the 
agents’ cognitive, observational mechanisms are still online and deeply entrenched. But all this just 
means in a nutshell: if there were PPSA, it should be able to directly ground the group’s practical 
knowledge of a non-observational kind about the we-action. But it can’t, for there is no genuinely 
non-observational knowledge about the we-action. Therefore, there is no PPSA accompanying shared 
intentions. 
 
Note that this is not to say that the agents cannot be aware that, in sharing an intention, they belong 
to a group (an awareness linguistically formulated along the lines of “I am aware of being member of 
us” or “I am aware of us sharing an intention”). This would be a form of awareness that an individual 
has about herself being a member of a plural self or about a plural self intending to φ. Note, however, 
that this state of awareness has the individual self in the subject position of the state and puts the 
group, us, in the content (not in the subject) position (that is, the awareness at stake is not plural self-
awareness). If understood in this sense, there is no reason to dispute that the agents (can) have such 
awareness. And it could be even conjectured that having this awareness facilitates the emergence of 
a sense of we-agency and hence the establishment of phenomenologically unique practical knowledge 
about the collective action.  
 
5. Conclusion. 
 
Let us conclude by highlighting some of the challenges that defenders of the PPSA-thesis would face 
to counter the presented arguments. First, they carry the explanatory burden of showing how genuine 
PPSA does exist in the DSQ case and, consequently, explain why this is not able to generate non-
                                                          
21 Obviously, this does not mean that the musicians are ‘mistaken’ in any sense. Quite the contrary, it just 
means that a novel aspect has emerged within the interaction.  
20 
 
observational knowledge about the we-action. One sensible reply here could be that the DSQ’s unique 
phenomenology of practical awareness is the best one can get at the collective level: collective agency 
is not individual agency and, hence, certain properties of the latter do not apply to the former.  
 
But then, two further obstacles would need to be overcome. The first obstacle is that the DSQ 
experience of we-agency presupposes an extraordinary degree of expertise as spelled out in Pacherie’s 
four criteria of: structure, scale, degree of specialization, and longevity or transience of the collective 
(2014: 34). It is arguably contra-intuitive to limit the notion of collective agency only to those cases 
that fulfill these criteria. The second obstacle is that, even if these four factors are all in place, a strong 
sense of we-agency emerges incredibly rarely. Without the expertise in question, such strong sense 
of we-agency never gets off the ground. Interkinesthetic affectivity and the sense of we-agency 
experienced on rare occasions by the DSQ is clearly a property incipient in certain form of practiced 
group agency, not a foundational aspect of collective agency. 
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